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not restric.ted in its application to members of that race. Its protection
is also available "when the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated,
and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single
out that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable
classification." 80
CH.Ans KivBar.
Criminal Law-Premeditation and Deliberation-Jury Instructions-
Brutality of the Killing as Affecting
It is proper in North Carolina in a first degree murder trial
for the question of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation to
go to the jury with the instructions that the jury may use the conduct
of the accused before and after the crime, along with other attendant
circumstances, in deciding whether the elements of premeditation and
deliberation were present.1 Our court has held to be admissible as
evidence of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation: absence
of quarrels between the accused and the deceased,
2 previous threats,3
preparations made for the crime,4 absence of provocation,5 declarations
made by the accused, 6 and subsequent acts of the accused,7 other than
flight.
s
But there is some uncertainty in the holdings of the court as to
the exact circumstances in which the jury should consider the subse-
quent acts of the accused in determining premeditation and delibera-
tion. This uncertainty arises when cases approving an unqualified in-
"Hernandez v. Texas, 74 Sup. Ct. 667, 670 (1954).
State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950) ; State v. Chavis, 231
N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949); State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 38 S. E.
2d 29 (1943); State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82, 150 S. E. 678 (1929).
'State v. Watson, 222 N. C. 672, 24 S. E. 2d 540 (1943); State v. Baity,
180 N. C. 722, 105 S. E. 149 (1920). It is interesting to note that while the
absence of quarrels between the accused and the deceased has been held to be
evidence from which the jury could infer premeditation and deliberation, the
presence of quarrels between the accused and the deceased has only been held
by our court to be evidence from which the jury may infer malice and ill-
feeling.
State v. Hawkins, 214 N. C. 326, 199 S. E. 284 (1938); State v. Bowner,
214 N. C. 249, 199 S. E. 31 (1938) ; State v. Payne, Z13 N. C. 719, 197 S. E.
573 (1938) ; State v. Grainger, 157 N. C. 628, 73 S. E. 149 (1911).
'State v. Baity, 180 N. C. 722, 105 S. E. 200 (1920) ; State v. Daniels, 164
N. C. 464, 79 S. E. 953 (1913).
' State v. Stewart, 226 N. C. 299, 38 S. E. 2d 29 (1946) ; State v. Cain, 178
N. C. 724, 100 S. E. 884 (1919).
' State v. Johnson, 172 N. C. 920, 90 S. E. 426 (1916).
"State v. Westmoreland, 181 N. C. 590, 107 S. E. 438 (1921).
' State v. Blanks, 230 N. C. 501, 53 S. E. 2d 452 (1949); State v. Evans,
198 N. C. 82, 50 S. E. 2d 678 (1929) ; State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 506, 130 S. E.
308 (1925). The reason for not holding flight as evidence from which the jury
might infer premeditation and deliberation is that flight from a crime might
just as easily result from a fear of guilty circumstances as from a guilty con-
science.
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struction to the jury that they may consider evidence of the defendant's
conduct before and after the crime in determining premeditation and
deliberation,9 are contrasted with the case of State v. Westmoreland,'°
which would seem to require a qualification of the instructions. In
that case the court considered in detail the effect of subsequent acts
of the accused. The court cited authority which it noted might indi-
cate, depending on the circumstances of the case, that any unseemly
conduct toward the corpse of the person slain, any indignity offered
it by the slayer, or the concealment of the body might be evidence of
express malice and of premeditation and deliberation in the killing.
A close examination of the only North Carolina case1 ' cited in this
authority reveals that the court was saying that these acts of the ac-
cused should be considered in determining malice, and that it did not
consider the issue of premeditation and deliberation. It was the con-
clusion of the Westmoreland case that the better rule is that acts subse-
quent to the crime should be considered in determining whether there
was premeditation and deliberation only when those acts were of the
type which show a preconceived plan,' 2 which continues to completion
after the commission of the crime. The court felt that this should be
the criterion used by the jury in inferring premeditation and delibera-
tion from the.subsequent acts of the accused. So the present position
of the North Carolina Supreme Court is probably that subsequent acts
of the accused should be considered to determine premeditation and
deliberation only when the subsequent acts of the accused are in fur-
therance of an obviously preconceived plan on the part of the accused
to take the life of the deceased.
This is further accentuated by those cases holding that acts by the
accused subsequent to the crime are evidence only of the general guilt
of the accused as opposed to the specific elements of premeditation and
deliberation.'8 Against this background, the court is now allowing
the question of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation to go
to the jury with the unqualified instruction that they may use the de-
fendant's conduct after the crime in determining premeditation and
" State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950) ; State v. Chavis, 231
N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949); State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 38 S. E.
2d 29 (1943) ; State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82, 150 S. E. 678 (1929).
10 181 N. C. 590, 107 S. E. 438 (1921).
State v. Robertson, 166 N. C. 356, 81 S. E. 689 (1914).
12In the Westmoreland case, the defendant, immediately after the killing
began to dispose of the body of the deceased. He secretly concealed it in an old
well, and his attempt to dispose of it was accompanied with such precision and
certainty that it was obvious that it was a part of his preconceived plan to kill
the deceased. His actions after the killing were only in completion of this
preconceived plan.
s State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 506, 130 S. E. 308 (1925); State v. Atwood,
176 N. C. 704, 97 S. E. 12 (1918).
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deliberation. 4 This is probably being understood by juries to mean
that the conduct after the crime may be considered in finding pre-
meditation and deliberation of the defendant without considering wheth-
er this conduct is a part of the preconceived plan of the defendant to
take the life of the deceased. This seems to be contrary to the previous
holdings of the court that these subsequent acts of the defendant are
to be considered only a evidence of guilt generally, and not of pre-
meditation and deliberation.
In further examining the wide discretion of the jury in considering
the circumstances of the crime in its determination of premeditation
and deliberation, it becomes obvious that the discretion is the same
if the killing is done methodically without violence, as when it is ac-
complished in a brutal and ferocious manner. However, in a case of
the latter type, should the jury be allowed to infer premeditation and
deliberation from the brutal manner of the killing alone?
While this question has not been directly decided by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, it has said in State v. Stanley,15 "The vicious,
ferocious, and brutal manner of the slaying by two slashes of the razor
which almost decapitated the victim engenders an inference of pre-
meditation and deliberation distinct from the presumption of second
degree murder by the intentional use of a deadly weapon and merged
therein." The other evidences of premeditation and deliberation in this
case were strong and no doubt conclusive. However, the court's
language on the aspect of brutality may show a tendency to miscon-
strue the early cases in such a manner as to destroy the conventional
distinction between malice and premeditation and deliberation.16 Simi-
14 State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950); State v. Chavis,
231 N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949); State v. Harris, 233 N. C. 697, 38
S. E. 2d 29 (1943) ; State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82, 150 S. E. 678 (1929).
" 227 N. C. 650, 654, 44 S. E. 2d 196, 199 (1947); accord, State v. Bynum,
175 N. C. 777, 782, 95 S. E. 101, 103 (1918), where this language was used:
"There was an absence of any altercation or quarrel which might point to a kill-
ing without malice and without a deliberate intent to kill. The manner of the
killing, cutting the throat from ear to ear, the beating up of the head and the
breaking in of the nose would indicate or at least was evidence from which
the jury could infer that the killing was not merely from malice which would
make it murder in the second degree but was a deliberate intent to kill in order
to conceal this crime or his intent to commit crime against the person of the
victim. These were matters for the jury." The evidence here would have
heavily favored a verdict of first degree murder occurring in an attmpt to
commit rape.
" Under the common law the court several times held that the brutality of the
killing would permit an inference of malice. State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (1839) ;
State v. Chavis, 80 N. C. 364 (1879); State v. Boon, 82 N. C. 879, 19 S. E.
705 (1894). Under statutory murder, however, the court was to determine
whether all the evidence which allowed a permissible inference of malice at
common law would permit the additional inference of premeditation and de-
liberation. Despite the language of the Stanley case, 227 N. C. 650, 654, 44
S. E. 2d 196, 199 (1947), it is believed that in the cases there relied on the
court has fallen more in line with the common law cases and held brutality
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larly, the court has allowed the brutality of the killing to affect its
disposition on the question of legal provocation.
1 7
Definitions of premeditation and deliberation as expounded by the
court have varied little. To premeditate is to think beforehand, the
length of time being immaterial; to deliberate is to form an intention
to kill, which intent is executed in a cool state of blood in furtherance
of a fixed design to accomplish the unlawful purpose of taking the life
of another.18 Deliberation connotes weighing the thought of the kill-
ing with some semblance of reason, if only for a brief moment. Feroc-
ity and brutality in a killing do not logically seem to result in an
inference of premeditation and deliberation, since it does not seem
that the killing would be more deliberately and coolly executed because
it was accomplished in a brutal and vicious manner. Psychologically,
extreme violence usually suggests thoughtlessness, passion, and even
insanity, and while psychological tests may not alw.ys be applied to
the realm of the law, they may have much significance here.'9
of the killing as an inference of malice rather than premeditation and deliberation.
In State v. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. E. 49 (1904), the court held that the
brutality of the crime would be attributed to a malicious disposition. In State
v. Robertson, 166 N. C. 356, 81 S. E. 189 (1914), the court cited the common
law case of State v. Jarratt, 23 N. C. 76 (1840), in saying that the manner of
the killing was evidence of express malice. In State v. Bynum, 175 N. C. 777,
95 S. E. 101 (1918), the court again considered the brutality of the killing. It
held that the brutality of the killing was evidence from which the jury could
infer premeditation and deliberation, but it is believed that the jury considered
that the brutality of the killing was done to cover up the crime of rape or an
assault with intent to commit rape on the deceased, and that the brutal manner
of the killing was to be considered in that aspect in determining premeditation
and deliberation in the case. Thus, in an examination of the traditional use of
drawing an inference of malice from the manner of the killing, it is uncertain
whether the court would actually want to draw an inference of premeditation
and deliberation from the brutal manner of the killing standing alone, although
the dictum in the Stanley case does seem to support such a conclusion.
"'In at least two cases the North Carolina Supreme Court has left the
impression that there can be no provocation sufficient to justify a killing in a
brutal manner, and that when there is such a killing that there can be no such
thing as a sufficient legal provocation. In State v. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 689,
47 S. E. 49, 51 (1904), the court's language was that when the killing is done
in a brutal and ferocious manner it "will be attributed to a malicious disposi-
tion and not to a provocation." Accord, State v. Bynum, 175 N. C. 777, 782, 95
S. E. 101, 103 (1918), where the court used these words: "There could hardly
have been any provocation to cause the beating up of a woman and cutting
her throat from ear to ear but the deliberate intent to kill." Quacre as to
whether the brutality of a killing should entirely negative a legal provocation,
though the possibility of a provocation sufficient to justify such a brutal killing
might seem remote.
" State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950); State v. Wise,
225 N. C. 746, 36 S. E. 2d 230 (1945) ; State v. French, 225 N. C. 276, 34 S. E.
2d 157 (1945) ; State v. Hawkins, 214 N. C. 326, 199 S. E. 284 (1938) ; State
v. Payne, 213 N. C. 719, 197 S. E. 573 (1938); State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82,
150 S. E. 678 (1929).
"' Premeditation and deliberation are mental elements connected with thought.
Since, of necessity, they must be determined by circumstances, if the circum-
stances suggest absence of thought they could be helpful in determining the
mental attitude of the accused.
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Before the Act of 1893,2 which divided the crime of murder into
first and second degree, malice was presumed from the fact of the
killing, and the killing having been shown, the offense was murder
unless the contrary appeared from circumstances of justification, alle-
viation, or excuse. Such a killing was the present equivalent, in effect,
of murder in the first degree.21 With the enactment of the statute,
the elements of premeditation and deliberation were added to malice to
constitute the elements of the crime of first degree murder.22 As the
court differentiated between these two degrees and the elements neces-
sary to establish them, it allowed an inference of malice from such gen-
eral states of mind as hate, spite, and a general design to effect harm,
or to take life without just cause,23 while proof of premeditation and
deliberation same to require some evidence of thought.24 Therefore,
in examining the elements that constitute first degree and second degree
murder it would seem to be more logical to make the legal effect of
brutality in a killing a permissible inference of malice rather than of
premeditation and deliberation.
This is not meant to intimate that the circumstances surrounding
the killing should not be used to determine the presence of the elements
of premeditation and deliberation, but that the brutality and viciousness
of the actual killing would not be a true test of the mental attitude of
the killer. A circle might be drawn around the time of the killing at
a point which did not take from the jury consideration of the circum-
stances leading up to and after the killing. Within this circle the jury
should be instructed concerning permissible consideration of the bru-
2 oN. C. PUB. LAws, 1893, cc. 85, 281; Now codified as N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-17 (1953)."I State v. Hicks, 125 N. C. 636, 34 S. E. 247 (1899); State v. Johnson,
48 N. C. 266 (1855).22 N . C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953).
" State v. Benson, 183 N. C. 795, 799, 111 S. E. 869, 871 (1922), Chief
Justice Stacy, speaking for the court said: "Malice is not only hatred, ill-will
or spite, as it is ordinarily understood-to be sure that is malice-but it also
means that condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another
intentionally without just cause or justification. It may be shown by evidence
of hatred, ill-will, or dislike, and it is implied in law from the killing with a
deadly weapon." Accord, State v. Williams, 185 N. C. 643, 666, 116 S. E. 570,
582 (1923) : "Malice may arise from personal ill-will or grudge, but it may
also be said to exist (in a legal sense) wherever there has been a wrongful or
intentional killing of another, without lawful excuse or mitigating circumstances.
This is implied or legal malice."
2, State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950); State v. Chavis,
231 N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949) ; State v. Brown, 218 N. C. 415, 11 S. E.
2d 321 (1940) ; State v. Hawkins, 214 N. C. 326, 199 S. E. 284 (1938) ; State
v. Bowser, 214 N. C. 249, 199 S. E. 31 (1938) ; State v. Payne, 213 N. C. 719,
197 S. E. 573 (1938). Some of the cases have held that if the circumstances
show a formed design to take life, this is murder in the first degree. However,
this formed design to take life must have in it the elements of premeditation
and deliberation to comply with the statutory requirements. See State v. Stewart,
226 N. C. 299, 38 S. E. 2d 29 (1946).
1955]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tality of the killing in determining premeditation and deliberation, to
prevent confusing those elements with malice.
North Carolina and other jurisdictions are in accord in sending the
issue of the premeditation and deliberation of the defendant to the
jury with the instruction to consider all attendant circumstances of
the crime.25 Some jurisdictions seem to lean toward an attitude which
would allow the brutality of the killing alone to be evidence from which
the jury could infer premeditation and deliberation. 2 1 Though no trend
can be shown, primarily because the courts have not considered whether
premeditation and deliberation could be inferred from the brutality of
the killing alone, there is a probability that they are allowing the tradi-
tional differences between malice and premeditation and deliberation to
be confused, by not instructing the jury specifically on the legal effect
of a killing accomplished in a brutal manner.
In determining the presence of premeditation and deliberation, it
is generally true that there are several factors involved, with the jury
weighing all of them at the same time. What weight they give to each
factor is not ascertainable. Of course, the brutal manner of a killing
cannot be entirely disregarded where a jury is attempting to determine
the elements of premeditation and deliberation. It probably always
plays an uninvited role since a brutal manner of killing will naturally
have more effect on the emotions of the jurors than the situations in
which this element is lacking. Nor would it be advisable to minimize
those aspects of brutality and atrocity that might really aid in deter-
mining whether premeditation and deliberation were present. This
situation might occur where there was an extension of brutality into
such a period of time that it bordered on torture, or where the cir-
cumstances of brutality and atrocity which lead up to the crime are
such as obviously indicate plan or design. However, evidences of
brutality in the actual killing would ordinarily seem to be no evidence
of premeditation and deliberation.
A ghastly murder makes objective determination of the facts difficult
under any circumstances. The aim of the court is to have the jury
consider the circumstances of the case in its most reasonable and
thoughtful state of mind. With this in view the trial judge may, in
his discretion, refuse to allow the jury to see horrible and ghastly photo-
" Bramlett v. State, 202 Ark. 1165, 156 S. W. 2d 226 (1941) ; Craig v. State,
205 Ark. 1100, 172 S. W. 2d 256 (1943) ; Robinson v. State, 69 Fla. 521, 68 So.
649 (1915); State v. Cox, 128 N. J. L. 108, 23 A. 2d 555 (1942); State v.
Leakey, 44 Mont. 354, 120 Pac. 234 (1911) ; State v. Fitch, 65 Nev. 668, 200 P.
2d 991 (1948) ; State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 108 P. 2d 641 (1941).
Craig v. State, 205 Ark. 1100, 172 S. W. 2d 356 (1943); People v. San-
ducci, 195 N. Y. 361, 88 N. E. 385 (1909) ; Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa.
434, 128 Atl. 77 (1925). But ef. People v. Heslen, 27 Cal. 520, 163 P. 2d 21
(1945); State v. Porello, 33 N. E. 2d 23 (Ohio 1940).
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graphs of the crime if no purpose would be served other than to excite
the emotions of the jury.27  As a parallel to this commendable limita-
tion on the use of photographs, it would be desirable to limit the per-
missible inference which can be drawn from the brutality of the kill-
ing to malice rather than premeditation and deliberation, with the
exceptions stated previously. When the fact of brutality is brought
to the attention of the jury without specific instructions concerning its
consideration, the jury is left with absolute freedom to give whatever
weight, emotional or otherwise, to the brutal manner of the killing.
Thus, it is very possible that the brutality connected with the actual
killing is affecting the juries of North Carolina, as well as other juris-
dictions, in a very persuasive manner on the issue of the premeditation
and deliberation of the accused. Such reasoning could be very injurious
to justice in a particular case, and it would appear that the dicta of
the North Carolina Supreme Court would tend to condone such a re-
sult, if reached.
28
The law should deal with the shrewd, the calm, the butcher, and
the madman in the same manner. By no other procedure can it truly
adhere to those rules of reason which we call our law. The trial judge
can, with more discriminatory instructions, better guide the jury in
rendering a verdict which is not tainted with uncertainty as to the true
state of the law, and that is more in accordance with legally sanctioned
interpretations of premeditation and deliberation. By so doing he
will aid in limiting the use by the jury of emotions which have arisen
because of the brutal manner of the killing.
WILLIAM C. BREWER, JR.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Evidence of Speeding Viola-
tions Obtained by Use of Radar
Increasing use of the electronic speed meter, or "whammy"' as it
is more generally known, by law enforcing agencies in an effort to
2
7
STANSBURY, NoRaT CAROLIWA EVIDENCE , § 118 (1947).
" State v. Stanley, 227 N. C. 650, 654, 44 S. E. 2d 196, 199 (1947).
'The electronic radar speed meter, or "whammy" as it is generally known,
is one of the latest mechanisms by which state and local officials are combating
highway speed violations. The operation of the instrument requires the use
of two automobiles placed approximately one-quarter of a mile apart along a
highway. Each automobile is equipped with a radio so that the radar-patrol car
team is able to communicate with one another. One automobile contains a
radar transmitter, receiver, and recording dial. The transmitter casts an elec-
tronic beam across the highway and when a vehicle passes through the beam,
energy is reflected to the receiver, converted into "miles per hour," recorded
on a tape, and indicated on a dial. If the speed is excessive, the "interceptor
car," or other member of the team, is contacted by radio, given the speed and
description of the automobile, and the violator is arrested by the interceptor.
See the discussion in People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
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